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The Chinese Communists recently claimed that they had sponsored a revival of the almost obsolete Chuang dialect, and that a written Chuang language was in the process of being created.

The Chuang have long been engaged in agriculture; many Chuang own the land they cultivate, and many are landlords. When the Communists carried out land reform in the Central-South, the Chuang landlords, like the Han Chinese landlords were accused as exploiters of the Miao and Yao peasants.[18]

C. The Tung People

The Tung people who live on the plain have been assimilated into Han communities. Those living in the mountainous areas resemble the Miao and Yao and have their own customs.[19] Ethnically, they are probably related to the Chuang. Like the Chuang, the Tung have long been accustomed to an agricultural economy, and many are landlords. Like the Chuang landlords,

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18. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Feb. 18, 1952.

19. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, Kuang-hsi Chih Chien-she, [The Reconstruction of Kwangsi], Kweilin; Kuang-hsi Chieh-she Yen-chiu Hui, 1939, p. 512.

the Tung landlords, too, were accused of having exploited the Yao peasants during the land reform.[20] 563 565

D. The Yao People

The Yao community is divided into two classes: the landlord and the tenant. The landlords who own land on the mountain slopes are called Shan-chu (mountain proprietors). They usually wear their hair long, and are thus called Ch'ang-mao Yao [Long-haired Yao]. The Yao peasants, who move from one mountain to another when the soil is exhausted, are called Kuo-shan Yao [Cross-mountain Yao].[21] However, the number of Yao landlords is small, and most of the Yao peasants cultivate fields owned by Han Chinese or Chuang landlords.[22] Thus, Yao intermingle with Han and Chuang people in their daily economic life. [302]

A Kuomintang source states that Yao readily intermarry with the Han Chinese,[23] but recent 563 582

20. Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien, [as cited in footnote 16], pp. 155-56.

21. An ko-ming, Chung-kuo Shao-shu Min-tsu Feng-kuang, [Life of the Chinese Minority Nationals], Hong Kong, Hsüeh-wen shu-tien, 1955, pp. 109-10.

22. Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien, pp. 53-54.

23. Li Tsung-jen and Pei Chung-hsi, op. cit., p. 512.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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The social structure in the Central-South Region closely resembles those of other regions in China. It has, however, some unique features which can be traced to the region's geographical location and past history.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A. Social Classes

The people of traditional China often viewed society as being comprised of four occupational groups: the literati, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Soldiers had no social status and were not members of any group. Although this classification indicates that all members of society recognized the prestige of the literati and the low status of the merchants, it fails to account for two things: the wide diversity in wealth, standards of living, and cultural and recreational interests within each occupational group; and the free interchange of occupations among the top layers of the farming, merchant and governing groups.[1]

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1. In some dynasties, sons of merchant families were not allowed to join the governing group. However, with the help of economic resources, it was relatively easy for the third generation to come into the governing group. It was quite common for retired bureaucrats to engage in commerce.

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In reality, social stratification in Chinese society was not entirely based on occupational lines. Rich merchants and wealthy landlords were often linked by marriage, retail merchants and middle peasants were socially compatible, the social distinction between a craftsman and a simple peasant was even more difficult to draw, and bureaucrats were often wealthy landlords as well. Thus, if we employ the term social classes to mean the stratification of society on an economic basis, we will find that class lines cut across the traditionally accepted occupation-status classification.

However, members of all the occupational groups regarded the possession of land as the true indication of prestige and security. A landless peasant hoped to posses land, a peasant with some land hoped to acquire more, and the wealthiest landlord wished to do likewise. Artisans who had acquired savings would invest them in land. Merchants invariably put excess capital that might have been used for business expansion into land, although often they did not count on income from it as their principal means of support. Bureaucrats were even more preoccupied with owning land concomitant with their rise in officialdom. This is a common phenomenon in any society where other tangible assets for accumulation are lacking.

Although the possession of land was a criterion for determining prestige and, to a large extent, the sign of real power, prestige did not always result from wealth and the land-holdings

always succeeded in giving new skills to the student, it at least had taught him not to be satisfied with his lot, but to look to the future rather than to the past for betterment. With the increase of schools, there emerged in the cities a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years from their original environment. Students and intellectuals, seeking some common meeting ground, banded together, and with their newly-found organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although many students depended for their subsistence on their families, they had nothing to do with the cultivation or management of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions in the ruling elite, political power and economic power in modern China continued to be in the hands of a single group. When social mobility was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social roles were less clearly defined; the sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status in

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the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority of them came from middle-class, land-owning, and merchant families and were graduates of modern schools.[10] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

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During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the

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10. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skills, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition from a class society to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese Nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy the rights of the People. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The

second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers, through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers, through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by capitalism were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes. 565 668

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic stage and the beginning of a transitional stage which, will lead China to socialism. Land reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the ideology of the working class has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those

"possessing the ideology of the working class." 565
They acknowledge that not all Communists are 668
from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz. the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to learn modern political ideology as it is understood by the working class.

The classification of people according to 156
the ideology they prefer is one of the underlying 668
principles governing the activities of Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Democratic Women's Federation, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology. Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally

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The New Year's holiday has retained some of its old gaiety, although within the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a small percentage of town dwellers.[25] Major sports events and theatrical performances are scheduled for this season, and visitors from rural areas come to the city in large numbers. There is special provisioning of the city shops at the time of the mid-Autumn and the Dragon Boat festivals.

The cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[26] Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[27] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This identification and the opportunities offered by the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he once was in returning to a plot of land in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

25. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
26. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.
27. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

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The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a full briefcase and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly under discipline, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas and to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[28]

The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communists plan, the mores, the patterns of living for society as a whole.

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28. Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

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poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, professional stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

A. Farmers

The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with that of rich merchants, are all but non-existent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists of chiefly the poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. In fact, their mode of living tends to confine their interest to their own villages or to the limited area defined by the dialect they speak. A Cantonese farmer may feel as alien in Peking as in a foreign land. The farmers are only affected by the pressure of government taxation and legislation. Only in those areas overrun by invaders is the spirit of nationalism apt to arise. This was found to be true in Honan, Hupeh, and Hunan provinces, and in parts of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Kwangsi during World War II.

The Communists have made persistent efforts to "educate and propagandize" the farmers. The farmers in Hunan Province, for example, derive a large measure of pride and satisfaction from the knowledge that one of their fellow Hunanese, Mao Tse-tung, has become the leader of the nation. However, the fact that the farmers as a class have learned

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a few political terms as a result of Communist propaganda does not mean that they have developed a strong national feeling. Some of the farmers may regard the Communist effort to "educate" them as unwelcome interference. The younger farmers show a more favorable response to Communist propaganda.

The idea that he is to be given land in a manner to which he is totally unaccustomed probably has generated apprehension in even the poorest peasant who believed he wanted to be a landowner. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction. However, there is evidence that grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the marketing of farm produce have met a great amount of resistance. The poor farmer in China today is less happy than he was in the days immediately after the Communist land reform. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy toward the farmer may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm. Available reports show that neither the government nor the farmer is satisfied with the amount of relief and welfare work done thus far, nor with the manner in which this work is done. Where disaster strikes, farmers still die helplessly, as such was the case recently reported in Kwangtung.[1] Although starvation is by no means unprecedented in China, failure to prevent starvation alienates support from the present regime. On the other hand, some improvement in his life may induce the farmer to feel favorably disposed toward the government.

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The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture is derived from contact with foreign mission-

1. Ya-chou Tien-hsün [Asia Foundation Bulletin], San Francisco, Oct. 21, 1955, p. 6.

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aries. At one time foreign churches were established in all parts of Central-South China except a few of the remote districts along the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border and in western Kwangsi. Government efforts to foster xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultranationalistic segment of the Chinese elite, dated from the nineteenth century. Some farmers in this region, particularly those in Hunan and Honan, are likely to remember, for instance, the stories about the Boxer's Rebellion, which terrorized many foreigners. With relish, the Communists are re-telling such stories as specimens of "anti-imperialistic" expressions of the Chinese people. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries on the Mainland. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may chuckle at the thought of the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

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The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring land, provide a better education for his children, and maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the social ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmers to look more kindly upon the present regime.

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Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population -- the members of secret societies, for example, are traditionally opposed to government control. Farmers active in these groups may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings in which secret societies played an important part indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctively anti-foreign or anti-government characteristics. Others may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state.

B. Urban Workers

The group feeling of organized workers was aroused as early as the 1920's in industrial centers like Chengchow, Hankow, and Canton, where organized labor was involved in many political movements. The worker realized that he was "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that he had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the nation and its symbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communist policy to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He is likely to feel a sense of achievement when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also

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add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, in spite of the fact that such "benefits" remain largely promises.

On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are the lack of wage increases, a harsher work sechedule and loss of leisure time, and a visionary welfare program for the worker which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well he can put up with the physical hardship of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the worker too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class which is being fostered by the Communists and which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

C. Students and Intellectuals

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Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

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Though the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity among nations. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of importance. But on the negative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in government where they might attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals still harboring such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is a welcome move.

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The Communists have counted on the enthusiastic support of students. From among the students the Communists recruit their loyal cadres. Exposure to regimentation may lessen the student enthusiasm for the Communist regime. Although anti-Communist sources in Hong Kong have reported a sharp decrease in the number of overseas Chinese students returning to the Mainland, the fact that some continue to return to China indicates the strong appeal of Communist ideology to literate Chinese youth. The Communists, however, may be expecting too much of their program of indoctrination; the young may give loyal support to a totalitarian regime, but it is unlikely that they can entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism.

D. Businessmen and Industrialists

Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist, although in reduced number. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sound-phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of state could evoke intimate sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers, except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation of the Chinese economy.

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involved 21, 900, 000 members, or 73 per cent of the total population of 30, 000, 000. Among the workers in twleve cities and the laborers employed at the Hsin Yi coal mines, 71, 711, or 47 per cent, of a total of 152, 613 men, were members of the trade union.[10]

In ten hsiang in Chia county, 223 landlord families and 283 rich peasant families, 9 per cent of the population of 5, 863 families, owned more than 1, 900 mou (about 316 acres) of land before the "Liberation" -- 49 per cent of the land in the ten hsiang. Although the anti-despot movement and the rent-reduction movement had reduced their holdings, the average acreage owned by "landlords" and "rich peasants" remained nearly twice as much as that owned by the peasants and hired farmers. After reform, the average amount of land owned by the "landlord" became 1. 46 mou (about 1/6 of an acre), that of the poor peasants was raised to 1. 5 mou, that of the rich peasants to 1. 9 mou, and that of the middle peasants was increased from 2 mou to 2. 7 mou.[11] These figures suggest how sweeping the land reform movement was. Land reform was of first importance to the Communist regime because its inauguration gained the support of the peasants who formed the majority of the population.

Hupeh Province, in the Yangtze Valley, has a greater concentration of industry than the neighboring Honan Province. As in other provinces, land reform became a major part of the Communist program in Hupeh. Li Hsien-nien, chairman of Hupeh, reported that the movement for rent re-

10. Ibid., p. 828.
11. Ibid., p. 828.

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There are 99 counties and three municipalities, with a total population of 27,460,000, in Kwangtung Province. The vice-chairman, Fang Fang, reported that, of this number, 19,210,000 were peasants. A table released by Chen Han-sen, a research fellow of sociology and economics at the Academia Sinica, was quoted by Fang Fang,[17] as follows: 30 per cent of the arable land in Kwangtung Province was designated as a source of family revenue for the ancestor-temple; 23 per cent of the arable land was owned by 110,000 landlord families; 13 per cent was owned by 220,000 rich farmer families; 13 per cent was owned by 1,090,000 families of the middle peasantry; and 19 per cent was owned by poor and hired peasants in 4,040,000 families. These figures, Fang Fang maintained, showed the inequality of land distribution; 53 per cent of the arable land was owned by the landlord families, who constituted only 2 per cent of the total number of families in the province. Fang Fang said: "The People's Government must take a cautious attitude because this area was late in being liberated and because its geographical position is too remote to be influenced by the older liberated areas. Furthermore, the proximity of this province to Hong Kong and Macao makes it more accessible to bandits and spies who are always trying to stir up disturbances.[18] The people of Kwangtung are not so submissive as those in other provinces, in spite of the fact that much propaganda work had been done by the Communist regime to induce them to accept land reform.

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17. Fang Fang, "Kuan-yu Kuang-tung T'u-ti Kai-ko Wen-t'i Ti Pao-kao" ["Report on Land Reform in Kwangtung Province"], Ibid., p. 938.

18. Ibid., pp. 941-42.

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Table 1 indicates that the average size of farms in Kwangtung Province is only 6.7 shih-mou (1.1 acres), the smallest in Central-South China. The farms in Kiangsi Province rank first in average size, 14.9 shih-mou (2.5 acres), but these averages are substantially below the pre-war size of farms in Japan, which was 16.5 shih-mou (2.75 acres).[5]

III. THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

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The Chinese Communists' Land Reform Movement followed a deliberate pattern, although methods of implementation varied from place to place, as when the techniques employed were modified in order to conform to special circumstances in different localities. The Land Reform Law in Central-South China was promulgated in July 1950. The law itself is too long to be discussed here, but it was on the basis of class differentiation that land redistribution was begun.[6] (For the methods used by the Chinese Communist Party in carrying out the land reform program, see Section V, "Communist Political Power in the Rural Area" in chapter on "Political Dynamics" of this handbook.)

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5. Wu Yuan-li, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 117-126.

6. The Agrarian Reform Law of the People Republic of China, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1950.

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According to the "Report on the Work of the Central-South Military and Political Committee"[7] by Teng Tzu hui, the Communist deputy chairman, the masses of "hired hands," "poor peasants," and "middle peasants" of Central-South China had been subjected, over a long period of time to persecution and oppression had now become masters of the nation. During the first half of 1951, a campaign began to implement the basic principles, which called for reliance on "farm laborers" and "poor peasants," for unity with the "middle peasants," and neutralization of the "rich peasants" in order to wipe out the feudalistic "landlords." As a result, the redistribution of land in areas with an aggregate population of 68 million was completed between the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951.

By the end of 1951, nearly 69 million shih-mou (11,500,000 acres) of land, 5 billion catties (2,500,000 tons) of grain, 784,000 head of cattle, more than 12 million farm implements, and more than 9 million houses and huts were "confiscated" or "requisitioned" for redistribution.[8] Based on an investigation of

7. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, December 13, 1951.

8. Teng Tzu-hui, "Chung-nan Chün-cheng Wei-yüan-hui Pao-kao", "Report on the Work of the Central-South Military and Political Committee," Yangtze Daily, December 13, 1951.

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16 counties in four provinces in the region, the index of land-holdings of different classes of peasants and landlords after land reform, using the average land-holding per capita as 100, was distributed in the following manner.[9] 423 565

TABLE OF LANDHOLDING

Landholders	Index No.
Ex-landlords	80
Poor peasants and farm laborers	90
Middle peasants	110
Rich peasants	130
Small land lessors	150

Tu Jun-sheng, the Communist chairman of the Land Reform Committee of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, reported that land reform was carried out in the Central-South China Region in accordance with the general policy of the Central People's Government. The Communists claimed that they had eliminated the feudal system of land ownership, that ex-landlords were given a chance to "reform themselves through labor," that the "poor peasants" and "farm laborers" were saved from poverty and given an opportunity to improve their livelihood, and

9. Ibid.

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that the "middle peasants" were given encouragement, to retain a part of the "rich peasant's" economy.[10]

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In order to determine whether the land reform has been "properly" carried out, the Land Reform Committee adopted a re-examination system. They started to re-examine the land holdings in over 1,100 hsiang. It was found that in nearly half of them the "reform" was not thorough enough, and that in the remaining half, it was "half raw," which propabably meant that the work was inefficient or lacking in thoroughness. As a matter of fact, some landlords were not classified as landlords at all. Consequently some ex-landlords began to clamor for the return of their confiscated property while others became difiant toward the land reform and chanted: "The sky may be red for three days, and the sky may be black for three days, but eventually we'll see it blue again;" or "Although our hat of poverty has been removed, our hat of grief is still on our heads."

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It is clear that the Communist cadres had encountered difficulties in carrying out the land reform. After the "re-examination" was completed in groups of villages during 1950, the cadres reported that the "defects"

10. Ibid.

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could be organized out of the surplus farm labor in order to serve in Korea. Second, in order to stabilize their political power in China Mainland, it was necessary for the Communists first to gain completed control of the rural masses, who constitute about 80 per cent of the entire population. The only weapon which the Communists could use was "land reform."

Generally speaking, the farm size, after "land reform," was more or less equalized. Although the average amount of land held per capita was a little over two shih-mou (1/3 acre) in Central-South China as a whole, in the over-populated areas, the per capita land holdings was even lower than the average.

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Regarding the disposition of the ex-landlords, a set of new regulations, promulgated by the Kwangtung People's Government in January 1955, provided favorable treatment for the ex-landlord class among the overseas Chinese families.[11] The essential features of the "favorable treatment" are as follows:[12] (1) the period of "reform through labor" for

11. Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily], Hong Hong, January 23, 1955.
12. Ibid.

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such landlords would be shortened from five years to a year and a half if they had been law abiding and had the support of the rural masses of their own communities; (2) after such "favorable treatment," they were required to write to their overseas relatives about their own experiences; and (3) they were required to participate in productive activities immediately.

The chief motive of the "favorable treatment" was to encourage more overseas Chinese to send funds to Communist China, hoping that such funds would strengthen the national treasury.[13] It was reported that even the overseas Chinese families who had fled to Hong Kong or Macao during the climax of the Land Reform Movement were also eligible for such treatment.

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13. In pre-Communist days, the total overseas Chinese remittance constituted from 40 to 50 per cent of China's total international receipts. The amount increased from $93,300,000 U.S. in 1935 to $200,000,000 in 1938. (See C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China, Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1933, p. 208; and Tsu-kuo chou-k'an (China Weekly), Hong Hong, No. 120, April 18, 1955, p. 12.) But according to the most recent estimate, the total overseas remittance in 1954 was less than $20,000,000 (Ch'en Yüan-huai, "Lun Chung-kung Ti Ch'iao-hui" ("On Communist China's Overseas Chinese Remittance), China Weekly, No. 120, April 18, 1955, p. 12.